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NOTES 
AITACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT-CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-Garnishment of Wages 
Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The 
Sniadach Case and Its Implications £or Related Areas of 
the Law 
Americans today enjoy an unprecedented level of material 
wealth, attributable in part to the great expansion of the modern 
consumer credit industry.1 Unfortunately, readily available credit 
has had numerous victims as well as many beneficiaries. Congress, 
worried that the exploitation of consumers by unscrupulous cred-
itors was a contributing cause of such diverse phenomena as 
consumer bankruptcies,2 urban riots,3 and even suicide,4 passed re-
form legislation in 1967 to "safeguard the consumer."5 
One hotly disputed portion of the consumer protection bill was 
that dealing with wage garnishment. The most ambitious proposal 
on this matter sought the total abolition of wage gamishment.6 Fac-
1. Consumer debt outstanding rose from a level of $5.665 billion in 1945 to 
$63.821 billion in 1962. By July 1969 it had risen further to a level of $116.597 billion. 
55 FEDERAL REsERVE BULL., Sept. 1969, at A54. 
2. Hearings on H.R. 11,601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 502 (1967) 
(statement of Sidney Margolius) [hereinafter Hearings]: "As is well known, there are 
more consumer bankruptcies today than in the big depression of the 1930's. Such 
personal bankruptcies ••• have jumped 240 per cent in the past ten years." 
3. Hearings pt. 2, at 661 (statement of David Caplovitz): "Numerous newspaper 
accounts have quoted ghetto residents as rationalizing the looting on the grounds that 
they have been victimized and robbed by the merchants for many years." 
4. Gannon, Seizing Pay-Unions, Firms, Lawyers Seek To Curb Garnishing as Its 
Incidence Rises, Wall St. J., March 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6, reprinted in Hearings pt. I, 
at 71: 
One payday in January, auto worker Carl W. Clark discovered his entire week's 
take-home pay of $112.39 had been turned over to the state of Indiana for de-
linquent state income taxes. Beset by debts, he asked officials at Ford Motor Co.'s 
plant in suburban Chicago Heights, Ill., for his accrued vacation pay to tide him 
over. 
Next payday, he learned [that] Indiana-the state where he used to live-had 
received $208.84 out of his $363.93 in wages and vacation pay. The 24 year-old 
father of a young boy, not knowing how much he owed Indiana tax collectors 
(the two deductions actually satisfied the claim) became despondent over the pay 
loss. Two days later, Carl Clark placed a .22 calibre rifle under his chin and shot 
a bullet into his brain. 
This suicide has spurred anew wide-ranging inquiries into the consequences 
of consumer debt problems. 
5. Preamble to H.R. 11,601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in Hearings pt. 
I, at 3. The "bill as enacted-the Consumer Credit Protection Act-may be found in 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
6. See H.R. 11,601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. II (1967), reprinted in Hearings pt. I, 
at 35-36. At least two states-Pennsylvania and Texas-now have statutes which outlaw 
wage garnishment entirely. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1966); TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. art. 
4099 (Supp. 1966). In addition, wage garnishment prior to judgment is prohibited by 
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.104, now in force in Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14A (1969)], Utah [UTAH CoDE ANN. tit. 70A (1967)], and Guam. 
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tors advanced in support of that proposal included the demonstrated 
correlation between the number of consumer bankruptcies and the 
harshness of garnishment laws,7 the fact that wage garnishment often 
results in loss of employment,8 the need to alleviate the burden on 
the courts that is created by the large number of garnishment cases,9 
7. Hearings pt. I, at 419 (testimony of Estes Snedecor, Referee in Bankruptcy, D. 
Ore.): · 
[T]he one overriding cause precipitating consumer bankruptcies is the garnishment 
or threat of garnishment of wages coupled with an unrealistic wage exemption. 
This is dramatically demonstrated by comparing the number of consumer bank-
ruptcies in States permitting garnishment of wages with those prohibiting garnish-
ment entirely or restricting it to only a small portion of wages. 
Hearings pt. 1, at 506 (statement of Sidney Margolius): 
It is noticeable that the states with the toughest garnishment laws [that is, those 
that operate most harshly against the debtor] have the highest bankruptcy rates 
including California, Ohio, Virginia, Michigan and Minnesota. Colorado, with 
much less population, had about 4300 bankruptcies and wage-earner :plans in one 
recent year, compared to only about 1000 in Texas and Pennsylvania which do 
not permit garnishees. Virginia, with less population than Florida which does not 
permit garnishees, has eight times as many bankruptcies. Ohio with about the 
same population as Texas, has about 50 times the bankruptcies. 
Figures for bankruptcy filings for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, yielded an 
important comparison between the number of filings in states which have harsh gar-
nishment laws and the number of filings in states which prohibit or strictly limit 
garnishment of wages. The states with harsh laws had the following number of bank-
ruptcy filings during that year: 
Alabama 
California 
Colorado 
Michigan 
Virginia 
10,214 
38,327 
4,306 
7,492 
Minnesota 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Tennessee 
4,844 
3,175 
17,680 
4,685 
9,384 
The states with mild garnishment laws, on the other hand, had far fewer filings: 
Alaska 208 South Carolina 160 
Florida 1,416 South Dakota 182 
Pennsylvania 1,601 Texas 1,330 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS ENDING 
JUNE 30, 1968, table F-1. See also Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study 
and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965); Snedecor, Why So Many Bank-
ruptcies in Oregon?, 40 REF. J. 78 (1966). 
8. Hearings pt. I, at 433 (statement of James E. Moriarty, Referee in Bankruptcy, 
C.D. Cal.): 
The effect of a garnishment can be devastating to a debtor. Most employers 
dislike garnishments because of the extra work and cost. As a matter of policy 
many employers will fire an employee after the second garnishment. Since Cali-
fornia law permits multiple levies a worker could be fired within an eight-day 
period, the time necessary to cover two weekly pay periods. Not only does this 
challenge the ability of the worker to provide for the family needs, but a worker 
who has been fired because of garnishment can become a faceless person in the 
army of the unemployed. He may be a well-qualified machinist whose talents are 
in demand, but he is unemployable. 
At a time when skilled employees are in great demand we must conclude that 
the exclusion of such a worker from our work force is a great waste of manpower. 
For a discussion of the relationship of wage garnishment to job loss, see Kerr, Wage 
Garnishment Should Be Prohibited, 2 PROSPEcrus 371 (1969). 
9. Hearings pt. I, at 104 (comment by Representative Frank Annunzio): 
I would also like to point out to you • • • the untold thousands-millions, I'll 
go that far-of dollars it is costing the local governments, local courts • • • , the 
judges that have to be paid, the process servers, the bailiffs, bringing these people 
before the court, having government take a part in settling these credit problems 
is a very, very costly procedure. 
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and the theory that the availability of the garnishment remedy 
promotes improvident extension of credit on irresistible terms to 
people who are unable to repay voluntarily.10 Those arguing against 
abolition maintained that the beneficial aspects of easy credit out, 
weigh the evils11 and that wage garnishment is necessary to protect 
the creditor.12 The garnishment provision finally enacted into law 
was a compromise measure. It exempts a minimum of seventy-five 
per cent of the debtor's wages from gamishment,13 and it prohibits 
an employer from discharging an employee whose wages have been 
garnished to satisfy any single debt.14 
This modest provision was the extent of congressional efforts to 
effect national reform of wage garnishment laws when the Supreme 
10. In this regard, Representative Leonor Sullivan has commented: 
May I say ••• that this is a part of the reason why a prohibition of garnish• 
ment of wages is in this bill-to make the seller just a little more careful about 
the kind of credit they give to people who have great desires but not the financial 
ability to fulfill these desires by paying for them. If they can buy what they desire 
so easily without worrying about liow to repay then it is enticing them into buy• 
ing something which they are too weak to resist. 
Hearings pt. 1, at 195. 
But a law of this kind on garnishment might have some effect with those who 
give too freely of this easy credit, and make it possible for those of us who do 
pay our bills to pay lower prices and not to have to continue to pay prices which 
make up the debts of those who are just buying and using and never paying. 
Hearings pt. 1, at 264. Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop• 
ment, quoted a statement on this point from the Governor's Report on the Los Angeles 
riot: 
Another problem is "easy credit" which can become harsh indeed if the dis• 
advantaged person defaults on his installment obligations. The debtor may ex• 
perience the loss of his property through repossesion, or the loss of his job through 
repeated garnishments of his wages. While it is easy to say that the improvident 
debtor brought this state upon himself, we deplore the tactics of some merchants 
and lenders who help induce low-income persons to become heavily debt-bur• 
dened. 
Hearings pt. 1, at 302, • 
11. Hearings pt. 1, at 278 (statement of Robert C. Moot, Administrator, Small 
Business Administration): 
Credit purchasing • • • is good for our economy and it is good for the pur-
chaser, particularly those with moderate or low incomes. Credit makes it possible 
for these people to own and enjoy the increasing variety of products and services 
supplied by our free enterprise system, products and services designed to make 
life easier and more bountiful. 
12. Hearings pt. 1, at 279 (statement of Robert C. Moot, Administrator, Small Busi• 
ness Administration): "Garnishment is very often the only legitimate means available 
to a businessman for final satisfaction of debts due him." 
13. The Consumer Credit Protection Act § 16'73, 15 U.S.C. § 16'7S (Supp. IV, 1965• 
1968) (effective July 1, 1970), provides that garnishment may reach the lesser of 25% of the 
debtor's weekly disposable earnings or the amount by which his weekly earnings ex• 
ceed thirty times the current federal minimum wage. 
14. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 1674, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (Supp. IV, 1965•1968) 
(effective July I, 19'70), provides: 
(a) No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his 
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. 
(b) Whoever wilfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not 
more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
This provision may prove largely ineffective, since it provides no protection for the 
employee who has previously had his wages garnished for a seperate debt. 
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Court, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation,15 handed down 
a decision which greatly accelerated the reform process. In 
Sniadach, a finance company, acting in accordance with Wisconsin 
law,16 had initiated garnishment proceedings in the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County against a debtor and against her employer as 
garnishee, alleging a claim of $420 on a promissory note. Pursuant 
to the procedure established by state statute,17 the garnishee an-
swered that he held $63.18 in wages owed to the debtor and that he 
would pay half of that sum to her and retain the other half subject 
to the order of the court. The debtor, who had been served with a 
summons and a copy of the complaint on the same day as the gar-
nishee, 18 moved for dismissal of the garnishment proceedings, alleging 
that the Wisconsin procedure violated her right to due process of 
law, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, by failing to pro-
vide her with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the 
seizure of her wages. The county court rejected that contention and 
held that the Wisconsin statute was constitutional; the Wisconsin 
supreme court affirmed that decision.19 The United States Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin supreme court and 
held that "the interim freezing of wages without a chance to be 
heard violates procedural due process."20 
The question of the constitutionality of prejudgment wage 
garnishment had never before reached the Supreme Court, although 
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 1969 DUKE L.J. 1285 and 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 750 
(1969). 
16. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969). 
17. WIS. STAT, ANN. § 267.11(6) (Supp. 1969) provides: 
[I]f the garnishee is indebted to or under any liability to the defendant for wages 
or salary, the garnishee answer shall state"the amount of the subsistence allowance 
paid over or to be paid over to the principal defendant and the balance held by 
the garnishee. 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18(12)(a) (Supp. 1969) provides for a subsistence allowance: 
When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the garnishee 
shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such wages or salary 
would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out of the wages or salary then 
owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without dependents or $40 
in the case of an individual with dependents: but in no event in excess of 50 per-
cent of the wages or salary owing. Said subsistence shall be applied to the first 
wages or salary earned in the period subject to garnishment action. 
18. WIS. STAT, ANN, § 267.07 (Supp. 1969) allows a plaintiff ten days after service 
on the garnishee within which to serve the principal defendant with notice of such 
service. 
19. Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W,2d 259 (1967). 
20. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (emphasis added). However, the Court left unanswered 
the question whether the required prior hearing must be a full trial culminating in 
judgment or whether a hearing with fewer procedural safeguards is sufficient. Although 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion contains language which might suggest the latter, 
it seems more consistent with the majority opinion that a full trial is required. See 
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 115 (1969). Indeed, a hearing 
without full procedural safeguards cannot be effective to protect a debtor's rights 
unless the creditor's claim can be clearly seen as frivolous. 
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in McKay v. Mclnnes,21 a 1929 memorandum decision, the Court 
had upheld a statute providing for prejudgment attachment.22 
McKay, which was cited as controlling by the Wisconsin court in its 
disposition of the constitutional argument in Sniadach,23 involved 
an attachment of realty and stock to satisfy a debt. Justice Douglas, 
writing for the Court in Sniadach, distinguished that case from one 
involving wage garnishment with the statement that "[a] procedural 
rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general ... does 
not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case."24 The 
Sniadach Court's refusal to apply the holding of McKay to a case 
involving wage garnishment suggests that the Court may be in the 
process of re-evaluating the entire area of prejudgment attachment 
and garnishment. In addition, the Sniadach decision may have im-
plications for other areas of law which concern the poor debtor. This 
Note will analyze the foundations, express and implied, of the 
Court's wage garnishment decision, and it will suggest possible ap-
plications of that decision to other problems. 
I. SNIADACH AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
It is generally accepted as fundamental to procedural due process 
that a person be afforded "notice and an opportunity to be heard" 
before he may be deprived of life, liberty, or property.25 Although 
21. 279 U.S. 820. 
22. In McKay, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Maine which had also upheld the statute. Mdnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 
699 (1928). The Court did so on the basis of Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), 
in which the prejudgment attachment of the property of an out-of-state defendant 
had been upheld even though the attachment statute required the defendant to post 
security in order fo defend the action, and on the basis of Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 
U.S. 29 (1928), which had sustained the prejudgment attachment of property of stock-
holders in an insolvent bank. These cases may be distinguished from Sniadach because 
of the uniqueness of wages. Moreover, those cases were decided forty years ago, before 
the concept of due process had reached its present level of development. 
23. 37 Wis. 2d at 169, 154 N.W.2d at 262. The Wisconsin supreme court also 
refused to consider many of the alleged constitutional defects with a potential for 
producing injustice, because petitioner herself had shown no hardship. 
24. 395 U.S. at 340. 
25. The Supreme Court relied on this principle at least as early as 1863 when, in 
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 233, it held that a discharge under a state insolvency 
law was ineffective against an out-of-state creditor: "Parties whose rights are to be affected 
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must be no-
tified. Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or 
property without notice and an opportunity to make his defence." 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 
at 233. Since that time, notice and an opportunity for a hearing have frequently been 
held to be fundamental requirements of procedural due process. Anderson Natl. 
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944): "The fundamental requirement of due 
process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are ad-
equate to safeguard the rights for which the constitutional protection is invoked." 
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963): "Due process • • • 
implies notice and a hearing." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 8: Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313 (1950): "[I]he Due Process Clause ••• at a minimum ••• require[s] that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 
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the Supreme Court has occasionally sustained a conditional pre-
judgment deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, pending 
the outcome of the case, it has usually done so only in cases involving 
some compelling governmental interest, such as safeguarding national 
security,26 protecting public health,27 or maintaining economic 
stability.28 Most of the recent cases involving notice and hearing 
requirements have not disputed the general proposition that the 
opportunity for a hearing is essential.29 In the few cases in which the 
requirement for a hearing has itself been questioned, the determin-
ative issue has most often been whether or not there was a de-
privation of a constitutionally protected right.30 
With regard to prejudgment attachment, the last time prior to 
Sniadach that the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of such a procedure was forty years ago, and at that time it sum-
marily rejected the argument that prejudgment attachment results 
in a denial of procedural due process.31 In Coffin Brothers v. Ben-
26. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), 
the Court held valid the summary discharge of a cafeteria employee in a Navy muni-
tions factory. 
27. In Ewing v. Mytinger &: Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), the Court upheld 
§ 304(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1964), al-
lowing seizure of misbranded articles without a prior hearing. 
28. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 33 U.S. 245 (1947), the Court held constitutional § 5(d) 
of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, § 5(d), 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12 
U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1964). That section authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
to prescribe by regulation the terms and conditions upon which a conservator may be 
appointed to take possession of a federal savings and loan association prior to the 
statutory hearing. See also Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), in which the 
Court upheld a Georgia statute allowing the establishment of prejudgment liens on 
the property of stockholders of insolvent banks. 
29. With regard to notice, see, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 
(1962): Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Both of 
these cases held that notice by publication is inadequate when the names and addresses 
of interested parties are known. 'With regard to the opportunity to be heard, see, e.g., 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), in which the petitioner was not given notice 
of proceedings initiated by his former wife and her husband for the adoption of the 
petitioner's son. When the adoption proceedings were successful, the petitioner moved 
to annul the adoption, but his motion was rejected by the lower court. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the hearing on this motion was inadequate, since the 
petitioner was forced to assume burdens of proof which, had he been accorded notice 
in the adoption proceedings, would have been borne by the opposing parties. See also 
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965): "The right to be heard must necessarily 
embody a right to file motions and pleadings essential to present claims and raise rel-
evant issues.'' 
30. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), which held that the right 
to future social security benefits is not a property right protected by the due process 
clause; English v. English, 117 S.2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), which held that 
the right to accrued but unpaid alimony is a property right protected by the due 
process clause; Siegal! v. Solomon, 19 III. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960), which held that 
the rights of a husband to his wife's society and affections are not "property" rights 
protected by the due process clause from state control. 
31. The Court in the 1920's upheld prejudgment attachment in three cases: Own-
bey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); and 
McKay v. Mcinnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929). See note 22 supra. 
992 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 68 
nett, for example, Justice Holmes disposed of that argument by 
noting that "nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging 
themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a 
lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit,"32 In the 
years during which the Supreme Court remained silent on the issue 
of the constitutionality of prejudgment attachment and garnishment 
procedures, state courts were faced with the problem of reconciling 
the decision that such procedures do not deny due process with the 
general notion that procedural due process requires notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing. One approach employed to uphold pre-
judgment attachments and garnishments was to assume that no inter-
est protected by the due process clause is involved in prejudgment 
attachment procedures since such procedures deprive a defendant 
merely of the possession or use of his property pending the outcome 
of the litigation, and to conclude that therefore the defendant is 
technically not deprived of any "property" without an opportunity 
to be heard. 33 A second theory recognized that the use of property 
constitutes a protected property right, but concluded that since at-
tachment only temporarily withdraws that right, the procedure does 
not result in a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due process 
clause.34 Neither of these attempts to rationalize the decision to up 
hold prejudgment attachment procedures is very persuasive, since, 
in the context of other issues involving the due process clause, the 
use of property has long been recognized as a property right pro-
tected by the Constitution from even temporary deprivation.35 How-
32. 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928). 
33. An example of the language commonly used comes from a foreign attachment 
case, Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932), in which the court stated: 
"In the meantime there has been no deprivation of property. The attachment, quasi 
[in] rem in nature, has operated only to detain the property temporarily, to await final 
judgment." 112 W. Va. at 198, 163 S.E, at 848. 
34. In Mcinnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), the court applied this 
rationale: 
The legal right to use and derive a profit from land or other things is prop• 
erty. , • . And the power of disposition at the will of the owner is property. 
Deprivation does not require actual physical taking of the property or the thing 
itself. It takes place when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the power 
to dispose of it at will are affected. 
But, although an attachment may, within the broad meaning of the preceding 
definition, deprive one of property, yet conditional and temporary as 1t is, and 
part of the legal remedy and procedure by which the property of a debtor may 
be taken in satisfaction of the debt, if judgment be recovered, we do not think 
it is the deprivation of property contemplated by the Constitution. 
In a more recent case, Shell Oil Co. v, Milne, 246 A.2d 837 (Vt. 1968), the court 
expressly invoked both this reasoning and that of Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 
S.E. 845 (1932), discussed in note 33 supra. 
35. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), for example, the Supreme Court 
held that low and regular flights of government aircraft over a chicken farm, which 
rendered the land useless, constituted a taking for which the owner must be com-
pensated under the fifth amendment, The Court considered the fact that the taking 
may have been only temporary, relevant solely for the purpose of determining the 
damages and not for the purpose of determining whether or not there had actually 
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ever they sought to rationalize their decisions, state courts may in 
fact have upheld the constitutionality of prejudgment attachment and 
garnishment procedures largely on the basis of the Supreme Court's 
recognition of the traditional acceptance of those procedures.36 In 
Sniadach, however, the Supreme Court recognized that, because of 
vast changes in the American economy, rules which were developed 
years ago to govern a broad range of attachments are inappropriate 
for the special category of wage garnishments. Thus, the fact that 
there was precedent for upholding the constitutionality of prejudg-
ment attachments did not dictate the decision of the case.37 
In addition to refusing to uphold prejudgment wage garnish-
ment on the ground that attachment is an historically accepted pro-
cedure, the Sniadach Court considered and rejected other grounds 
on which wage garnishment might have been upheld. As stated 
previously, the prejudgment deprivation of property can normally 
be sustained if such deprivation is necessary to protect a vital gov-
ernmental interest, or if the court finds that the procedure involved 
does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected 
right.38 Both Douglas' majority opinion and Harlan's concurrence 
rejected any applicability of the first theory.39 The Court saw noth-
ing in prejudgment wage garnishment "requiring special protection 
for a state or creditor interest."40 The second theory, however, re-
ceived more extensive consideration, resulting in a determination 
that prejudgment wage garnishment does deprive the debtor of his 
constitutionally protected right to property and thus requires ad-
herence to standards of procedural due process. 
After defining the interest of which the garnishment defendant 
is deprived as "his enjoyment of earned wages," the Court con-
been a taking. In Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), the Court declared 
similar action by a state to be a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The Supreme Court has also held that an unreasonable restraint on the 
use of property imposed by a zoning ordinance may be repugnant to the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
36. See text accompanying note 32 supra. 
37. 395 U.S, at 340: "The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal 
regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modem forms." 
For an account of the origins of attachment procedures, see G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 64 (rev. ed. 1940). See also Levy, Mesne Process in 
Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52 (1968). 
38, See notes 25·30 5upra and accompanying text. 
39, Justice Douglas stated that "[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the 
requirements of due process in extraordinary situations." 395 U.S. at 339. Similarly, 
Justice Harlan stated: "Apart from special situations ••. , I think that due process 
is afforded only by ••• 'notice' and 'hearing' ••• before [one] can be deprived of his 
property or its unrestricted use." 395 U.S. at 343. 
40. 395 U.S. at 339. It is not clear what kind of "special creditor interest" would 
be so compelling as to validate garnishment without the necessity of balancing opposing 
private debtor interests as well. See notes 26-28 supra and notes 51-56 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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sidered in detail the problem of wages, "a specialized type of prop-
erty presenting distinct problems in our economic system."41 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that the use of 
wages must be protected by the due process clause because there 
are "grave injustices made possible by prejudgment garnishment 
whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking."42 
He concluded that, since the result of prejudgment wage garnish-
ment is often the loss of employment,43 forced bankruptcy,44 or the 
coerced payment of false or inflated claims,45 the "procedure violates 
the fundamental principles of due process."46 The Court thus relied 
on the substantive evils resulting from wage garnishment as a basis 
for its determination that prejudgment wage garnishment cannot 
constitutionally be tolerated.47 
The majority opinion, however, left several of the underlying 
assumptions of the decision unclear. It failed, for example, to ex-
plain fully how the temporary denial of the use of wages constitutes 
a deprivation of property for purposes of the due process clause. In 
addition, it does not seem to have applied the balancing test nor-
mally used in cases in which the issue is whether there has been a 
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right so that notice and 
an opportunity for a hearing are required.48 Rather, the Court 
focused entirely on the individual's interest in obtaining his wages 
without delay and ignored the public interests favoring prejudg-
41. 395 U.S. at 340. 
42. 395 U.S. at 340. 
43. See note 8 supra. 
44. See note 7 supra. 
45. Project, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. 
REV. 743, 753 (1968): 
The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is 
usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands for collection fees. 
If the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt 
and collection charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will 
often sign a new contract or "payment schedule" which incorporates these addi-
tional charges. 
46. 395 U.S. at 342. 
47. It must be remembered that the holding of Sniadach struck down only that 
wage garnishment which occurs prior to a hearing. While the creditor is thus denied 
the ability to exert pressure on the defendant prior to trial on the merits, he may 
still have available his postjudgment remedies. Indeed, postjudgment wage garnish-
ment was upheld in Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed 
per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 (1969). The use of postjudgment garnishment by a creditor 
may in some circumstances render Sniadach's prohibition of prejudgment garnishment 
nugatory. If, for example, the creditor uses a device by which the debtor never gets 
notice of the hearing and thus loses the judgment by default (see note Ill infra and 
accompanying text), then that creditor can garnish the debtor's wages through a post-
judgment garnishment without ever confronting the debtor and yet without violating 
the principles established in Sniadach. It is argnable that such deprivation of a debtor's 
funds without his having a meaningful hearing comes within the prohibition of 
Sniadach. See note 95 infra. 
48. See note 51 infra and accompanying text. 
April 1970] Notes 995 
ment wage garnishment. The Court thus failed to articulate fully 
the theoretical bases for its decision. Yet those bases must be under-
stood before the impact of Sniadach can be accurately gauged. 
Although the Court based its holding on the distinct character 
of wages, it failed to elucidate fully why the immediate enjoyment 
of wages merits protection by full due process guarantees. As noted 
previously, the use of property has been recognized in other contexts 
as a property right protected by the Constitution from even tem-
porary deprivation;rn Similarly, when the property involved is wages, 
there are persuasive reasons for concluding that the deprivation of 
the use of such property pending the outcome of a lawsuit results in 
the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. The primary 
value of wages lies in the ability of the wage earner to exchange 
them for goods and services. To the many families that are depen-
dent upon the immediate use of wages to buy the staples of everyday 
life, a temporary "freezing" of those funds strips them of much of 
their value. Loss of the ability to purchase necessities for one week 
is not wholly counterbalanced by double buying power in some 
week thereafter.50 Economic realities, then, compel the conclusion 
that depriving a person of the use of his wages, even temporarily, 
constitutes a deprivation of a significant, if quantitatively elusive, 
property right. 
In previous cases in which the hearing requirement has been 
questioned and the determinative issue has been whether or not 
there was a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, the 
courts have usually employed a balancing test to weigh countervail-
ing public and private interests.51 The Court in Sniadach, however, 
49, See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
50. Even though most families can obtain necessities without cash by means of 
credit arrangements of various kinds, the argument advanced in the text retains its 
force. There will always be a group of wage-earning families with a credit rating so 
poor that no credit at all is available. Moreover, many other families will have already 
reached the limit of credit available to them. Indeed, for the wage-earner whose 
wages are a likely target of garnishment, credit will be necessarily limited. The plight 
of the defendant in a wage garnishment case may be more easily understood through 
an illustration. Assume that a spurious claim is brought. Assume further that the 
defendant must forgo, instead of half of his wages, half of the goods and services for 
which he normally exchanges them. What can he do without: housing? groceries? 
transportation? Surely it is not unrealistic to assume that a significant number of 
wage earners-particularly those most susceptible to wage garnishment-have their 
entire paychecks budgeted in advance. If these goods and services are not made avail-
able to the defendant until months later when his claim is vindicated, they will 
hardly be of equal value. 
51. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 8ll (2d Cir. 1967) (expulsion of 
cadet from Merchant Marine Academy requires a fair hearing): "to determine in any 
given case what procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine 
and balance the nature of the private interest affected and the government interest in-
volved •••• " Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959): "Application of the broad 
restraints of due process compels inquiry into the nature of the demand being made 
upon indMdual freedom in a particular context and the justification of social need 
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appears to have avoided such a balancing test. The Court thus ig-
nored the public interests that may be served by prejudgment wage 
garnishment, that is, the interest in ensuring that valid claims will 
be collectible and the interest in promoting the extension of credit. 
The public interest in ensuring the collectibility of debts is ev-
idenced by the many statutes and rules providing creditors' rem-
edies52 and by the court facilities and personnel provided by public 
funds to enforce creditors' claims against their debtors.53 In fact, 
many statutes authorize prejudgment attachment specifically in 
order to prevent a debtor from transferring his property, with intent 
to defraud creditors, during the pendency of litigation to collect a 
debt.5.t It is argued that permitting wages to be garnished prior to a 
in which the demand rests." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 14 (1965): "The requirements 
of due process are a function not only of the extent of the governmental restriction 
imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the restriction," See also Finfer v. 
Caplin, 344 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1965). The decisions have often relied on the language 
of Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGr.ith, 341 U.S. 123, 163 
(1951) (concurring opinion): 
Due process is ••. a delicate process of adjustment , ••• 
• • • The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the 
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives 
to the procedure that was followed ••• , the balance of hurt complained of and 
good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the 
judicial judgment. 
E.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) 
(cafeteria cook in Navy munitions plant not denied due process when required to 
turn in her security badge without a hearing): Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 
29¾ F,2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961) (expulsion of students from state university without 
a hearing held a violation of due process clause). 
52. Statutes and rules provide numerous devices besides attachment and garnish• 
ment procedures to facilitate the collection of claims, All states, of course, provide 
procedures for execution against the debtor's property to satisfy claims that have been 
reduced to judgment. E.g., PA, R. Crv. PRo. 3101-215. In addition, the default provi-
sions of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code permit creditors secured by 
personal property to repossess and to liquidate their interests in the collateral without 
judgment upon the debtor's default. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-501 to -507. A 
number of states also permit devices such as the cognovit note, in which any attorney 
is authorized to appear on the debtor's behalf to confess judgment against him. E.g., 
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMN., CREDITOR-DEBTOR LAws IN OHIO 11-13 (1959). See also 
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS (J. McKnight ed. 1963). Although there are additional 
policies underlying the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-500 (1964), that Act 
also manifests a policy of maximizing the size of the estate available for distribution 
to general creditors. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 70c, 70e, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, llO(c), 
llO(e) (1964), as amended, 11 U.$.C. §§ 107, llO(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
53, See note 9 supra, 
54. See o. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 67 (rev. ed. 1940). 
One sample statute is in force in Michigan: 
The circuit courts of the state shall have the power by attachment to apply 
to the satisfaction of a claim due or to become due any interest in things which 
are subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state and belonging to the :person 
against whom the claim is asserted whether or not the person himself is subject to 
the judicial jurisdiction of the state. The courts may exercise the jurisdiction granted 
in this section only if action is taken in accordance with court rules promulgated 
to protect the parties and it is asserted that I or more of the following situations 
exists: 
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hearing prevents the debtor from defrauding his creditor, because it 
keeps the debtor from dissipating the fund which may ultimately be 
used to satisfy the debt. Recent studies, however, have challenged 
the thesis that wage garnishment is an effective means of promoting 
the collectibility of claims. Figures for collection agencies show that 
"[i]n New York where the creditor can only garnishee 10% of a 
man's wages, or New Jersey or Nebraska where he is limited to 20% 
there is a higher percentage of recovery of debts than in California 
where the creditor can get 50% .... "55 The public also has an 
interest in promoting the easy availability of consumer credit, since 
that availability helps the economy to expand and at the same time 
allows consumers to enjoy a standard of living that would otherwise 
be unattainable. The enhancement of economic growth and material 
comfort may come at too high a cost, however, if the availability of 
a facile collection device encourages extension of credit to persons 
unable to pay and destined therefore to suffer garnishment with its 
often tragic consequences. For these reasons, it appears likely that, 
even if the Court had applied a balancing test in Sniadach, it would 
have found that the public interests were outweighed by the "grave 
injustices"56 resulting from prejudgment wage garnishment. 
Nevertheless, the Court can be criticized for its failure even to 
discuss the relative weight of the public interests. The most prob-
able explanation for that failure is that the Court decided that the 
well-documented effects of wage garnishment made application of 
the usual balancing standard unnecessary, even though some legit-
imate public interests may be advanced by prejudgment wage gar-
nishment. The Court seemed to feel that the substantive "evils" re-
sulting from wage garnishment are so clear and so likely to occur 
(1) that the defendant has absconded or is about to abscond from the state or 
is concealed therein to the injury of his creditors; 
(2) that the defendant has assigned, disposed of, or concealed any of his prop-
erty with intent to defraud his creditors; 
(3) that the defendant is about to assign, dispose of, or conceal any of his 
property with intent to defraud his creditors; 
(4) that the defendant has removed or is about to remove any of his property 
from the state with intent to defraud his creditors; 
(5) that the defendant has fraudulently contracted the debt or fraudulently 
incurred the obligation respecting which the suit is brought; 
(6) that the defendant is not a resident of the state and has not resided therein 
for 3 months immediately preceding; 
(7) that the defendant is a foreign corporation. 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.401 (1968). 
55. Friedman, The Repossessed, NEW REPUBLIC, April 27, 1968, at 10. This data can 
be misleading, however, since it focuses only on collection agencies, with no explana-
tion of the extent to which they use garnishment, See also Brunn, Wage Garnishment 
in California: A. Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1214, 1236-42 (1965). 
Brunn attempts to show that consumer lending is unrelated to the availability of 
garnishment. But his assumptions and conclusions are questioned by Homer Kripke, 
who argues that the public is not in a better position without prejudgment remedies. 
See Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U, L. R.Ev. I (1969), 
56. 895 u .s. at 340, 
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that balancing was not required. But that feeling was itself highly 
subjective and required an implicit weighing of interests on the part 
of the Court. As Justice Black argued in his dissenting opinion in 
Sniadach, the Court seems to have been acting as a superlegislature 
in striking down prejudgment wage garnishment on account of its 
bad effects.67 Indeed, the majority opinion does appear to be quite 
heavily underscored by a value judgment concerning the impro-
priety of such garnishment. Thus, it is arguable that, while the 
Court claimed to base its decision solely on grounds of a denial of 
procedural due process, it was also motivated by the old concept of 
substantive due process. 
The principal contribution of Sniadach, then, seems to lie in its 
recognition that a temporary deprivation of the use of property may 
be prohibited by the due process clause even when the deprivation 
will be brief and the debtor will eventually receive a hearing on the 
merits. 68 In the remainder of this Note, that constitutional concept 
will be discussed in terms of its implications for four areas of the 
law: other forms of prejudgment attachment and garnishment, pro-
cedural rules that discriminate against poor litigants, the doctrine 
of relievable duress, and postjudgment garnishment. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF SNIADACH FOR OTHER FORMS OF 
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT 
The Court's emphasis in Sniadach on the well-proved evils re-
sulting peculiarly from wage garnishment raises the question how it 
will treat other types of prejudgment attachment and garnishment. 
Clearly it cannot ignore them completely and return, without ex-
planation, to the pre-Sniadach position that all attachments and 
57. 395 U.S. at 344-50. Justice Black stated: 
[T]he Court •.. strikes down this state law ••• because it considers a garnishment 
law of this kind to be bad state policy, a judgment I think the state legislature, 
not this Court, has power to make. 
395 U.S. at 344. 
The Wisconsin law is simply nullified by this Court as though the Court had 
been granted a super-legislative power to step in and frustrate policies of States 
adopted by their own elected legislatures. The Court thus steps back into the 
due process philosophy which brought on President Roosevelt's Court fight. Argu• 
ments can be made for outlawing loan sharks and installment sales companies but 
such decisions, I think, should be made by state and federal legislators, and not by 
this Court. 
395 U.S. at 345. 
In the first sentence of the argument in her brief, petitioner urges that this Wis• 
consin law "is contrary to public policy"; the Court apparently finds that a 
sufficient basis for holding it unconstitutional. This holding savors too much of 
the "Natural Law," "Due Process," "Shock-the-conscience" test of what is con• 
stitutional for me to agree to the decision. 
395 U.S. at 350. 
58. Of course in situations not involving attachment, the courts have long rec-
ognized that the due process clause protects against deprivation of the use of prop• 
erty as well as of the ownership of the property itself. See note 35 supra. 
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garnishments unrelated to wages are permissible;59 such a course of 
action would be precluded by the Court's recognition in Sniadach 
that the historical acceptance of attachment procedures will no 
longer suffice to support the conclusion that those procedures com-
ply with the due process clause. On the other hand, it is unlikely 
that the Court will act against other forms of attachment and 
garnishment with the same one-sided, summary method which it 
employed in Sniadach. There are no comparable data demonstrating 
the adverse effects of those procedures, and any data that could be 
assembled would probably have less emotional impact.60 Indeed, the 
majority opinion in Sniadach spoke of wages as a "specialized" form 
of property. 61 Thus, the best prediction seems to be that the Court 
will use the normal due process balancing test in order to determine 
whether the temporary deprivation in the particular case amounts 
to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property right and 
thus will not be allowed prior to a hearing. That approach, it is 
submitted, is the most desirable, since it recognizes the important 
rationale of Sniadach that a temporary denial of the use of property 
during the pendency of a civil action may be a deprivation forbid-
den by the Constitution, and since at the same time it avoids a sub-
jective judgment, such as that apparently made in Sniadach, that the 
gravity of the deprivation is so clear as to obviate the need for con-
sideration of the public interests. 
In evaluating due process arguments concerning other attach-
ment and garnishment procedures, it is helpful to separate the 
various forms of prejudgment seizures into three major categories: 
attachment or garnishment of tangible real and personal property, 
garnishment of intangibles, and foreign attachment. 
In general, prejudgment attachment is a creditor's remedy in-
volving seizure of the alleged debtor's property prior to adjudication 
of the creditor's claim on the merits.62 The chief public interests in 
favor of summary seizure of tangible real and personal property are 
those discussed above with regard to wages-to promote the exten-
sion of credit and to ensure a fund from which to collect valid 
claims-although these interests must be offset by the public in-
terests in favor of the debtor.63 In order for a court to hold that pre-
59. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. 
60. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, apparently believes that all prejudgment 
deprivations are unconstitutional. See note 39 supra. The Wisconsin supreme court 
appears to agree, at least partially, with Harlan, for it has held a prejudgment de-
privation other than that of wages unconstitutional. Larson v. Fetherston, 172 N.W.2d 
20 (Wis. 1969). See note 75 infra. But see note 64 infra and text accompanying notes 
63-89 infra. 
61. 395 U.S. at 340. 
62. H. 0LECK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS 2 (1948). 
63. See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra. 
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judgment attachment of tangible property unconstitutionally 
deprives a defendant of a protected property interest, the court must 
be persuaded that the alleged debtor's interests outweigh the sub-
stantial public concerns supporting seizure. 64 Since the relative 
strength of the public interests in the summary procedure and that 
of the individual interests infringed differ for various types of at-
tachment, the opposing interests are best evaluated by analyzing 
separately the attachment of realty, the attachment of personalty, 
and the garnishment of personalty. 
Prejudgment attachment of realty and immovable personal 
property should raise no serious constitutional question. Since gen-
erally prevalent procedures do not involve the dispossession of the 
owner of the attached property prior to adjudication, this type of 
attachment does not deprive him of the property's beneficial use 
until there has been a hearing on the merits. It merely places on 
the property a lien which restricts that property's alienability.65 
Moreover, except in extraordinary circumstances, the temporary 
loss of the right to sell or encumber one's land free from a creditor's 
inchoate lien is a deprivation of only a fraction of the value of the 
land.66 On the other hand, the public interest favoring the pre-
judgment attachment of realty is quite strong. Indeed, there is often 
justification for the fear that, absent prejudgment attachment, a 
debtor may transfer his land without consideration, hoping to make 
himself judgment proof and thus to leave the creditor to absorb the 
debt without a remedy.67 Attachment of realty therefore usually 
amounts to only a slight inconvenience to the debtor, and that 
nominal infringement of his interest should not outweigh the public 
interest in promoting the collectibility of accounts. 
Prejudgment attachment of movable personal property, however, 
64. At least one court has indicated its unwillingness to determine the question of 
the constitutionality of attachment and garnishment procedures in the absence of the 
specific factual context of a particular case. Although the Supreme Court of California 
has held in two cases that California's prejudgment wage garnishment procedures do not 
comply with the requirements of procedural due process [Cline v. Credit Bureau, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 669, 464 P .2d 125 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 
(1970)], it has refused to decide a case in which the attorney general of the state sought 
to have all prejudgment attachments declared unconstitutional. The court held that since 
the case presented neither a party in interest nor a concrete set of facts, the attorney gen• 
eral's complaint constituted a request for an advisory opinion, which the court does not 
have jurisdiction to render. People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
670, 464 P .2d 126 (1970). See notes 73, 88 infra. 
65. C. NADLER, CREDITOR AND DEBTOR RELATIONS 77 (1956). 
66. One exception might be the case of the attachment defendant who is a real 
estate dealer. -
67. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. If a conveyance is made by a debtor to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, they may avoid it. But by fraudulently conveying his 
property, the debtor may harass his creditors and increase the cost of collecting their 
debts. See generally G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 58-62b, at 
79-103 (1940). 
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ordinarily results in immediate seizure and removal by an officer of 
the court. 68 The individual thus loses possession and all beneficial 
use of his property prior to adjudication. I£ the personalty is of 
everyday importance, such as a piece of furniture, an appliance, or 
an automobile, the individual may suffer substantial injury when he 
is deprived of its use.69 Moreover, the public interest in ensuring 
that a fund is available for collection purposes is only slightly ad-
vanced by allowing attachment of personalty prior to adjudication, 
since a defendant would seldom be moved to transfer a necessity in 
order to defraud a creditor.70 Therefore, at least when the use of the 
attached personalty is of everyday importance, the interests of the 
alleged debtor should prevail, and a hearing should be required 
prior to attachment. 
Prejudgment garnishment is a specialized form of attachment 
that may be used to reach tangible personal property owned by the 
defendant but in the possession of a third party, as well as to reach 
debts owed to a defendant by a third party.71 Garnishment of tan-
gible property normally should not affect a debtor's interest, since 
the possession and beneficial use of the property involved are in the 
third party and the alleged debtor is deprived only of his right to 
alienate the property.72 That restriction on alienation is necessary 
to protect the public interest in ensuring a collectible fund, since 
the defendant who is not using his property may be presumed more 
68. See C. NADLER, supra note 65, at 77. 
69. This discussion, of course, applies only to consumers, and not to businesses 
or corporations whose assets might be attached. The hardship recognized in Sniadach 
is the temporary loss of the necessities of life; corporations, while technically persons, 
do not eat or require the use of consumer goods for their existence. Moreover, this 
discussion does not apply with regard to property of the debtor which is exempt from 
attachment. For a discussion of state exemption statutes, see Karlen, Exemptions from 
Execution, 22 Bus. LAw. 1167 (1967). 
70. In certain circumstances, it may be possible for a debtor to transfer title to a 
necessity while retaining the use of the property. A debtor might, for example, trans-
fer title to his automobile to a relative without forgoing either possession or use of 
the car. Similarly, certain appliances might be transferred to a relative or friend 
living nearby with the understanding that the debtor could continue to use the 
property. Except in cases such as these, however, it is unlikely that the debtor would 
transfer a necessity in order to defraud his creditor. If a debtor should fraudulently 
transfer such property, creditors may, of course, avoid the transfer (see note 67 supra), 
although they are much less likely to discover a transfer of movable personal property 
than a transfer of real property. 
71. H. OLECK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS 3 (1948). 
72. This analysis becomes somewhat more complicated if the defendant, at the 
time of garnishment, retains the right to recover his property on demand from the 
third party. In that situation, the garnishment denies the defendant that right as well 
as the power to alienate. Since the defendant would, except for the garnishment, be 
able to recover and enjoy full use and possession of his property, he is placed in much 
the same situation by garnishment as he would be by an attachment suit in which no 
third party is involved. The validity of attachment of tangible property has been 
discussed previously, in the text accompanying notes 65-70 supra, and the same con-
clusions should apply to garnishment in this special situation. 
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likely to transfer it to defraud his creditors than would a defendant 
who is actually using the property. Thus the public interest should 
prevail and garnishment of tangible personal property in the hands 
of a bailee should be allowed prior to adjudication. 
In summary, attachment or garnishment of tangible property 
prior to a hearing should generally be found to be violative of the 
due process clause only when the property of which the owner is 
temporarily deprived is property that is important to daily life. It 
seems that these conditions would be fulfilled solely when movable 
personal property is attached. 73 
A second general category of prejudgment seizure is that of the 
garnishment of intangible assets-that is, the attachment of funds 
which are in the possession of a third party, but which are allegedly 
owed to the defendant. Wages owed to a defendant are one such type 
of funds; Sniadach established the proposition that a defendant may 
be deprived of the use of his wages only after he has been adjudged 
liable for a debt.74 Other funds may invoke considerations similar to 
those in Sniadach if the defendant has both the expectation of 
prompt receipt of the money and an immediate need for it-such 
as when he has no other income. Examples of such funds are a J?ank 
account and the income from a life trust. Sniadach should be control-
ling in a case in which such funds are the defendant's sole or pri-
mary liquid assets and are garnished prior to a hearing. In such a 
case, the defendant's significant interest in the use of the funds-an 
interest which is analogous to the wage earner's interest in the use 
of his wages-is not outweighed by the public interests in debt col-
lection and in economic expansion. 75 
For the more common type of garnishable debt or chose in ac-
tion, however, the defendant's interest in the use of the garnished 
fund seems to be relatively slight. For example, a defendant with 
73. But see text accompanying note 88 infra. If courts in particular jurisdictions 
are unwilling to undertake the burdensome factual examinations necessary to define 
the parameters of due process in the attachment or garnishment context (see note 64 
supra), the legislatures might solve the problem by enacting realistic exemption 
statutes to cover exceptional or hardship situations. See note 89 infra and accom-
panying text. But see note 78 infra. 
74. The supreme courts of Arizona and California have recently held, on the basis 
of Sniadach, that prejudgment wage garnishment is unconstitutional. Tennplan, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 463 P .2d 68 (Ariz. 1969); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669, 
464 P.2d 125 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 (1970). In 
Termplan, however, the court carefully limited its decision to the garnishment of wages. 
75. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a recent opinion based on Sniadach, held 
unconstitutional the prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts. Larson v. Fether• 
ston, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). The court included in its opinion dicta to the effect that 
all prejudgment garnishments violate the due process clause: "We think that no valid 
distinction can be made between garnishment of wages and that of other property." 
172 N.W. at 23. 
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accounts receivable which he neither needs76 nor expects to be paid 
immediately has little cognizable interest in the "use" of those ac-
counts-a use which is temporarily denied him by prejudgment 
seizure.77 Similarly, the defendant with a chose in action has no 
substantial, immediate interest which is abridged by prejudgment 
seizure. Moreover, the public interest in ensuring the existence of 
a fund for debt collection seems strongest in cases in which the only 
assets available for execution upon judgment are elusive cash funds. 
Thus, in general, prejudgment garnishment of intangible assets 
should not be held to deny a defendant due process of law except 
when such a defendant has both an immediate expectation of, and 
an immediate need for, the garnished fund.78 
The third general category of prejudgment attachments is that 
involving the immediate seizure of a defendant's property for the 
purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction when the defen-
dant resides outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. Quasi in rem 
jurisdiction extends to any attachable tangible or intangible prop-
erty of the defendant which is located in the forum state,79 and in 
most states, the defendant may make a personal appearance and still 
limit such jurisdiction to the value of the property that is actually 
attached.80 Thus, in order to determine whether the due process 
clause requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to 
seizure in a foreign-attachment case, the same public and private 
interests that are discussed above with regard to other kinds of attach-
ment and garnishment should be weighed, 81 and the same balancing 
process should apply.82 It is also necessary, however, to determine 
whether any considerations unique to foreign attachment should 
alter the balance. 
The chief public interests advanced in support of prejudgment 
76. It should be reiterated here that for purposes of analysis in light of Sniadach, 
the only need for funds which is constitutionally cognizable is a need for their use to 
obtain necessities. 
77. But see Arnold v. Knettle, 460 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), in which the court, 
relying on Sniadach, held that the garnishment both of wages and of accounts receivable 
violates the due process clause. 
78. It may be difficult to draft a statute to exclude garnishment in these excep-
tional situations. One solution may be to provide the defendant with notice at the 
same time that it is provided to the garnishee, and to allow release of the garnished 
funds upon defendant's sworn statement that he meets the criteria for the exception. 
79. For the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction by means of the garnishment of a chose 
in action, the "location" of such an intangible is any place at which the garnishee is 
subject to in personam jurisdiction. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
80. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. 
REV. 909, 948-55 (1960). 
81. For a discussion of the competing considerations in cases which do not involve 
foreign attachment, see text accompanying notes 62-78 supra. 
82. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
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foreign attachment are the state's right to control controversies aris-
ing within its borders and the state's interest in providing the protec-
tion of state courts to its citizens in their dealings with nonresidents. 83 
The use of prejudgment foreign-attachment procedures to achieve 
these goals, however, has been severely criticized in light of modem 
developments in the law relating to personal jurisdiction.84 The 
critics contend that, since long-arm statutes make personal jurisdic-
tion generally available in cases in which the nonresident defendant 
has sufficient contacts within the forum state to create a genuine 
state interest, quasi in rem jurisdiction established by prejudgment 
foreign attachment is likely to be used only when the state has no 
legitimate interest in the dispute.85 If this criticism is valid, assertion 
of jurisdiction by foreign attachment advances no state interests that 
are not already fully protected. 86 Hence, the determination of the 
constitutionality of various forms of prejudgment attachment and 
garnishment should be unaffected by the fact that the attachment is 
used to establish jurisdiction, at least if there are long-arm statutes 
that make personal jurisdiction readily available. 
In summary, the application of the Court's reasoning in Snia-
dach to other forms of prejudgment attachment and garnishment 
should result in a finding of a denial of due process only in isolated 
instances, such as those involving the attachment and removal of 
personal property essential to the defendant, or those involving the 
garnishment of intangible assets which the defendant needs in order 
to purchase daily necessities. In analyzing the constitutionality of 
the various forms of prejudgment attachment, however, it has been 
necessary to deal in generalities rather than in specifics. Thus, the 
resultant conclusions, while valid for most situations, may be invalid 
83. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction 1n Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, 
27 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1913). See also note 80 supra and note 84 infra. 
84. See, e.g., Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 303 (1962). 
85. See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and 
the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967); Developments in the Law-
State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960); Comment, Podolasky v. Devinney 
and the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip Off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426 
(1968). An example of the results which can occur when foreign attachment is used to 
gain jurisdiction in a place in which personal jurisdiction is unavailable is the .New 
York rule of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). The controversy in 
that case involved an automobile crash in Vermont, with a Quebec resident as de-
fendant. The New York court held that a New York liability insurer's obligation to 
defend the action is a "debt" sufficient to assert foreign-attachment jurisdiction. 
86. This conclusion depends on the existence of comprehensive long-arm statutes. 
An example of the current trend in this direction can be found in California. Prior 
to 1969 California had one of the least comprehensive long-arm statutes, permitting 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by California courts over only nonresident 
motorists [CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17451 (West Supp. 1969)] and fliers [CAL. PUB, UTIL. 
CODE § 21414 (West 1965)]. In 1969 the California legislature adopted a new statute 
permitting personal jurisdiction in California whenever constitutional requirements 
are satisfied. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 ('Vest 1969). 
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in the extraordinary case. For example, although the attachment of 
an automobile could cause severe hardship and thus require a full 
hearing if the defendant had no alternative means of transportation 
to and from work, the same type of attachment would be a mere 
inconvenience and should not require a full hearing if the defendant 
has a second car. 
Since the normal manner in which one whose property has been 
attached may raise objections based on the due process clause is 
upon motion for dismissal of the attachment,87 it may be argued that 
the extension of the Court's reasoning in Sniadach to the prejudg-
ment attachment of property other than wages would impose a great 
burden on the courts. In every case, there would be the potential for 
objections based on the due process clause. Even in cases in which 
such objections are ordinarily not well founded-such as cases in-
volving the attachment of real estate-the defendant might attempt 
to show that his is a special case, requiring dissolution of the attach-
ment on the ground of individual hardship. The great majority of 
these motions, however, would be susceptible of summary disposi-
tion. Only those motions involving a substantial probability of indi-
vidual hardship should occupy much of the court's time. Moreover, 
a body of case law indicating the circumstances in which attachments 
would normally be dissolved should develop fairly rapidly. When 
that case law has developed, it is likely that motions would be made 
only in cases similar to those in which prejudgment attachments 
have previously been dissolved. Indeed, the net effect of applying 
Sniadach to the attachment of other kinds of property could even be 
to conserve courts' time, since creditors might be discouraged from at-
taching property in situations in which it has become clear that the 
attachment would be dissolved on the defendant's motion. 
To the extent that there remains some danger of clogging the 
courts, that result may best be avoided by the drafting of compre-
hensive new attachment and garnishment statutes.88 The drafting 
of such statutes, however, may prove to be extremely difficult, be-
cause the constitutionality of a particular prejudgment attachment 
procedure may depend on the distinctive facts of a particular case. 
87. Mrs. Sniadach raised her claim under the due process clause in this manner. 
395 U.S. at 346. Since a claim under the due process clause centers around the al-
legation that the loss of the use of property pending a hearing deprives the debtor of 
necessities and causes hardship, the issue would be largely rendered moot by waiting 
until the hearing on the merits to raise it. Cf., e.g., MICH. Cr. R. 738.16, quoted in 
note 89 infra. 
88. In addition, if courts in a particular jurisdiction are reluctant to engage in the 
difficult and time-consuming factual analysis required to determine what property is 
"essential" or which assets the defendant actually "needs"--determinations necessary 
to a constitutional decision in a particular case-the legislature may be able to enact 
statutes to deal with these problems. See note 73 supra and note 89 infra and accom-
panying text. 
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The best solution seems to lie in devising a statute with broadly 
phrased provisions that are in line with the general conclusions of 
this Note. Such a statute would seem to be fair in the great majority 
of cases. In order to deal with exceptional cases, the statute could 
provide some speedy preliminary procedure for dissolution of the 
attachment on a defendant's showing of individual hardship. Be-
cause the public interests do not vary with the defendant's situation, 
they can be considered without argument in every case, and an ex 
parte hearing would be sufficient to deal with the hardship claim.80 
III. PROCEDURAL RULES THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST 
POOR LITIGANTS 
While the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the equal 
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to 
protect the rights of indigent criminal defendants, 00 it has failed to 
take comparable action on behalf of indigent civil litigants.91 Many 
89. For an example of a method currently in use for alleviating exceptional hard-
ship in garnishment situations, see MICH. CT. R. 738.16: 
Dissolution of Garnishment without Bond. 
(1) In exceptional circumstances, on notice and hearing, the court may, in the 
interests of justice, set aside a garnishment in whole or in part upon the fur-
nishing of a bond in an amount less than prescribed in sub-rules 738.14 and 
738.15, conditioned as therein provided. The court should give full consider-
ation to the following factors: 
(a) The nature of the plaintiff's claim, whether it is liquidated or unliqui-
dated; 
(b) The solvency of the principal defendant; 
(c) The likelihood of loss to the plaintiff if garnishment is terminated; 
(d) The relative priorities of the claims of employees and other persons; 
(e) The likelihood of irreparable harm to the garnishee defendant if garnish-
ment is not terminated. 
(2) Garnishment shall not be set aside under (1) if the garnishment is based on 
a judgment against the principal defendant. 
The Michigan rule, however, calls for an adversary hearing. The time needed to 
comply with this requirement may defeat the purposes of providing a preliminary 
dissolution procedure. But see note 78 supra. 
90. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which the Court held that the 
practice of charging defendants for trial transcripts which are necessary to prepare an 
appeal violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which the Court held that 
the due process clause guarantees a right to counsel in criminal cases regardless of 
ability to pay. 
91. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967), in which the Court refused to 
consider a Georgia summary-eviction statute requiring that the tenant defendant post 
bond in order to defend the action [GA. CODE ANN. § 61-303 (1966)]. Justice Douglas, in 
an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren, dissented, arguing that serious issues based 
on the equal protection clause were raised. The same Georgia bond requirement is 
before the Court again. State v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969), prob. juris. 
noted, 395 U.S. 974 (1969). This case has been argued before the Court and its decision 
is pending. 38 U.S.L.W. 3220 (1969). In a case argued the same day, Simmons v. West 
Haven Housing Authority, 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 250 A.2d 527, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 
957 (1969), the Court has been asked to reverse a holding of the Circuit Court of 
Connecticut, Appellate Division, that a Connecticut statute requiring a tenant to post 
a bond in order to appeal an adverse decision in an eviction action does not violate 
the equal protection clause even when applied to indigents. In Sandoval v. Rattikin, 
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states continue to enforce rules that put the poor litigant in a civil 
action at an unfair disadvantage.92 But the Sniadach holding that 
prejudgment wage garnishment is a violation of the due process 
clause may be helpful in developing arguments which, in conjunc-
tion with those developed under the equal protection clause, may 
be used to expand the rights of indigent civil litigants. 
One practice which might be halted on the basis of the reason-
ing implicit in Sniadach is that which requires litigants to post a 
bond in order to defend or bring an action. 93 Requiring a poor per-
son to post a bond as a prerequisite to engaging in a civil action is 
similar to a prejudgment garnishment of his wages in that both 
practices deprive the person of the use of his funds before he has 
been afforded a hearing in which to vindicate his claim. In both 
cases, the funds will be returned to the defendant if he wins. Of 
course, the bond requirement differs somewhat from prejudgment 
wage garnishment, since in the latter situation the defendant is 
directly deprived of the use of his funds, while in the former the 
poor litigant has the alternative of failing to post a bond and thus 
forefeiting his legal rights. But in both cases, the property interest 
involved is the use of funds which may be needed to purchase the 
necessities of life. Rights are of little value without remedies; and so 
if a poor litigant wishes to enforce his rights, he is compelled to post 
the bond and thus frequently to forgo the basic necessities because 
1195 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966), the Texas 
Court found that denying indigent defendants free counsel in a civil trespass-to-try-
title action was not a denial of due process. Of course, the Court has acted against pre-
judgment wage garnishment (Sniadach); and it has required that notice of trial must, 
whenever practicable, be more effective than that given through newspaper publication 
[Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
&: Trust Co., 1139 U.S. 1106 (1950)]. 
But cf. In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P .2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968), in which 
the Supreme Court of California held that the due process clause requires that an 
indigent defendant imprisoned under the process of mesne civil arrest be provided 
appointed counsel. 
92. See note 91 supra and notes 93-94 infra. 
93. For an example of a procedural requirement that a bond be posted in order to 
defend an action, see the Georgia statute discussed in note 91 supra. Numerous state 
laws and court rules require the posting of a bond in order to bring an action. A New 
York court rule, for example, requires the posting of a bond of not less than $250 in 
order to bring an attachment suit. N.Y.R. CIV. PRAc. 6212(b). An Ohio statute pro-
vides that a private action in equity for the abatement of a nuisance may be brought 
only upon the posting of a bond of not less than $500. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.03 
(Page 1954). Under Michigan law, a plaintiff may be required to post a bond in order 
to bring suit against a nonresident defendant [MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.741 
(1968)], while California law requires a nonresident to post a bond in order to bring 
suit [CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 1030 (West 1954)]. 
There is no need to distinguish defendants and plaintiffs for purposes of this due 
process analysis, since in either case the poor person is faced with deciding between 
waiver of a legal.right or the present use of his funds. The situation of a defendant 
who suffers a default judgment, however, seems more compelling than that of the 
plaintiff who cannot afford to file suit. 
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he cannot afford to pay for both. The bond requirement, then, not 
only has a chilling effect on the litigant's right to bring or defend 
an action, but it can clearly deprive the litigant of needed funds 
before he has had an opportunity for a hearing. The rationale of 
Sniadach might well be applied to prevent such a deprivation.94 
I£ Sniadach is interpreted to require a meaningful hearing before 
a person may be deprived of the use of needed property,95 then its 
underlying reasoning might also be useful in arguing that the due 
process clause requires extension of the right to counsel to civil 
litigants. Since a litigant's right to a hearing is often worthless unless 
he has counsel,96 the civil litigant today must pay for counsel in 
order to have a meaningful hearing; and the poor litigant frequently 
cannot do so unless he gives up the necessities of life. Thus, the 
94. In addition, many states have requirements that a litigant pay a fee in 
order to engage in a civil action. For example, Connecticut and twenty-six other states 
do not exempt indigents from a general requirement that court fees and costs be paid 
in order to obtain divorce. CIVIL LIBERTIES, April 1969, at 6, col. 3. In Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), a three-judge district court upheld this 
practice against a class action brought on behalf of indigent women in Connecticut 
who alleged that the requirement was violative of the equal protection clause and the 
due process clause. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 395 U.S. 974 
(1969). But cf. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968), in 
which the court held that a statute requiring service of summons by publication in 
divorce actions based on abandonment operated as an effective barrier to indigent 
plaintiffs' access to the courts and thus constituted a denial of equal protection. Fee 
requirements are also a problem to indigents in bankruptcy cases. The United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently rejected an attack on the 
constitutionality of fee requirements in the bankruptcy situation. It refused to review 
a referee's order denying the bankrupt's motion to vacate the order for payment of 
filing fees and to proceed in forma pauperis. 44 REF. J. 5 (1970). For a criticism of fee 
requirements in bankruptcy cases, see Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma 
Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1202 (1969). 
Since fee requirements deprive a litigant of the property itself and not merely of 
the use of it, Sniadach docs not apply directly. When poor litigants are involved, 
however, such fees should be subject to challenge on the same rationale as that in 
Sniadach. Since the fee requirement forces a poor person to choose between purchasing 
necessities and exercising his legal rights in a meaningful way, it requires that an in-
digent who wishes to pursue his rights sacrifice needed funds before he has had a 
hearing. The rationale of Sniadach would, at least arguably, prohibit such a depriva-
tion. Moreover, since the fee requirement is arguably a permanent taking of property, 
it would seem to present even a stronger case than would a bond requirement. 
95. The Court has stated in previous cases that a fundamental requirement of the 
due process clause is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), discussed in note 
29 supra. See also Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955); Ohio Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Public Util. Commn., 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937) (The hearing must provide for "the 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action."). With respect to the procedural 
safeguards which constitute a meaningful hearing in the garnishment context, and 
with respect to the question whether Sniadach requires a full trial-type hearing, see 
note 20 supra. Of course, the Court has also required meaningful notice of a hearing. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), discussed in note 
29 supra. 
96. In re Gault, 387 U.S. l (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); In re Harris, 
69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968). 
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failure to provide free counsel to the indigent civil litigant deprives 
him of needed funds before he can have a meaningful hearing.97 
Sniadach may be helpful in arguing that such deprivation is a de-
privation of property without due process of law and that therefore 
the poor litigant should be assigned counsel in civil cases. 98 
In determining the validity under the due process clause of 
procedural practices that discriminate against poor litigants, the 
courts should again employ a balancing test;99 but the interests to 
be balanced in this context are somewhat different from those 
previously considered with regard to attachment and garnishment 
procedures.100 The principal individual interest which the practices 
of requiring the litigant to post a bond and to bear the initial costs 
of litigation may offend is the interest in retaining the use of funds 
needed to buy the essentials of life during the pendency of an action 
in which one is seeking to pursue or to defend his legal rights. In 
addition to this substantial individual interest, there is a public 
interest in providing all persons easy access to the courts in order to 
promote the peaceful resolution of private disputes. 
The basic argument in favor of the present procedural practices 
is that they discourage the litigation of spurious claims. It might 
be argued that the elimination of this obstacle for indigents would 
grant the poor litigant free rein to utilize the courts for harassment 
purposes; his former position of unfair disadvantage would arguably 
be exchanged for one of unfair advantage. This problem can be 
avoided, however, by requiring the indigent to make a preliminary 
showing of good faith before granting his motion for waiver of a 
bond requirement or for appointed counsel. With respect to bond 
requirements, there is an additional interest in providing a fund 
97. Here again, as in the fee requirement situation, the deprivation is of the 
property itself and not merely of the use of it. See note 94 supra. 
Although poor plaintiffs may be able to get representation by working out a con-
tingent-fee arrangement, that option is not generally available to low-income defendants. 
Moreover, much of the litigation in which the poor are likely to become involved as 
plaintiffs, such as divorce actions and eviction suits, do not result in a monetary award if 
successful, and thus no contingent fee can be generated. B. SELIGMAN, POVERTY AS A 
Punuc IssuE 183-91 (1965); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1322, 1324 (1966). 
98. The Federal Trade Commission has recently ruled that indigent respondents 
in hearings before the FTC are entitled to have counsel provided by the Govern-
ment. The Commission stated: '1.Ve can think of nothing less conducive to fairness 
and due process in administrative procedures than to pit the power of the state • . . 
against a single individual and then to deny that individual the right to counsel 
•••• " In re American Chinchilla Corp., 38 U.S.L.W. 2386 (FTC Dec. 23, 1969); cf. 
In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P .2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968), discussed in note 91 
supra; Schuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession 
and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 55 (1969). 
99. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
100. See text accompanying notes 62-89 supra. Some of the interests previously 
discussed, such as the interest in promoting the extension of credit, are irrelevant 
outside the field of debt collection. 
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from which a successful adversary may receive reimbursement if he 
is ultimately awarded costs. That interest may be protected, how-
ever, by scrutinizing requests for the waiver of bond requirements 
more carefully than requests for the waiver of other procedural re-
quirements.101 Finally, a potentially great financial burden on the 
government may result from modifying present procedures. In 
addition to the direct cost of providing counsel to indigent civil liti-
gants, the cost of administering the court system could rise sharply if 
the elimination of some of the present barriers should lead to in-
creased litigation. 
While the arguments favoring the present procedures are not 
insignificant, they do not seem compelling. The most important 
interests which present practices seek to protect may be protected 
by alternative means; and the other interests do not weigh heavily 
in the balance in comparison with the combination of the strong 
individual interest in the immediate use of needed funds-an in-
terest which was recognized in Sniadach-and the public interest in 
freely accessible courts. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF RELIEVABLE DURESS 
Relievable duress is a doctrine which provides relief to a de-
fendant who, under the pressure of coercive tactics, has settled a 
spurious claim or has paid an inflated settlement for a legitimate 
claim. The issue of duress may be raised either as a defense in a suit 
to enforce the settlement or else in ·a separate action to obtain res-
titution of excess money paid.102 Unfortunately, courts have been 
extremely reluctant to recognize the pressure exerted through pre-
judgment attachment or garnishment as the type of cpercion that 
gives rise to a claim or defense under the duress doctrine, at least 
in the absence of proof that the creditor knew that his original claim 
was unfounded. Rather, the decisions have generally adopted the 
view that it cannot be considered duress to do what one has a legal 
right to do.103 Although the vast majority of opinions have denied 
defendants relief on that ground, the few courts which have applied 
the duress doctrine to attachment problems have employed a ratio-
101. Unlike bond requirements, fee requirements serve to protect the adversary 
only to the extent that they discourage the institution of spurious claims. Instead of 
indemnifying the adversary, fees are used to offset the administrative expense of the 
judicial system. Thus, fee requirements should be freely waived. See also note 94 
supra. 
102. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MxcH. L. REv. 253, 
256 (1947). 
103. Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Feeney Tool Co., 97 Conn. 
129, 132, 115 A. 629, 630 (1921): "If . . . the payment is made under the stress of 
lawful process lawfully used, the party can obtain no relief •••• Lawful compulsion 
is no duress." See also Kohler v. Wells, Fargo &: Co., 26 Cal. 606 (1864); Paulson v. 
Barger, 132 Iowa 547, 109 N.W. 1081 (1906). 
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nale similar to that used in Sniadach and have found particular 
prejudgment procedures unduly coercive. In two cases the duress 
doctrine was used to abate the injustice of prejudgment wage gar-
nishment.104 In a third case relief was granted on the ground of 
duress when the plaintiff garnished cash debts owed to the defen-
dant, knowing that the defendant badly needed the funds.105 
In the future, courts confronted with the duress issue in attach-
ment cases will have to consider the impact of the Sniadach opinion. 
The recognition in Sniadach of the pressure that can be exerted 
through prejudgment wage garnishment106 should spur a complete 
re-evaluation of the relievable duress doctrine as it is applied to 
attachments generally. In particular, it should cause courts to take 
a critical look at the maxim of current duress law that denies relief 
to the defendant under any circumstances in cases in which the 
plaintiff has a legal right to bring the attachment suit.107 
In addition to providing a more rational legal process, a modern-
ized duress doctrine could be of substantial practical benefit to a 
defendant who is wrongfully subjected to prejudgment attachment 
procedures. 'When a defendant's property is attached prior to a 
hearing, the customary manner in which the defendant may raise 
objections based on the due process clause is upon motion for dis-
missal of the attachment. But it is impractical for many defendants 
to adopt that course, since a hearing upon such a motion often in-
volves more lengthy court action than does proceeding to a trial on 
the merits,108 and that extended length of time prior to resolution 
of the dispute increases the injury resulting from loss of the use of 
the attached property. For example, a defendant who is left without 
a means of transportation when his automobile is attached will 
probably be unwilling to give up the use of his car for the extended 
period required to litigate a claim under the due process clause. 
Thus, if the motion-for-dismissal procedure remains the only means 
available to challenge prejudgment attachment on the basis of the 
due process clause, extension of the reasoning of Sniadach into the 
area of attachments generally may be very slow. A modern duress 
doctrine, however, might alleviate this largely practical impediment 
to asserting claims under the due process clause. If relief on the 
ground of duress were made available in these cases, a defendant 
104. American Medical &: Dental Assn. v. Brown, 140 Colo. 341, 344 P.2d 189 
(1959); Kelley v. Osborn, 86 Mo. App. 239 (1900). 
105. Vine v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N.W. 997 (1879). 
106. See text accompan}ing notes 42-47 supra. 
107. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. 
108. The best example of the time involved in litigating the due process issue on a 
motion to dismiss the attachment is Sniadach itself. The defendant in that case filed 
the motion to dismiss December 23, 1966, and waited until June 9, 1969, for final 
rc,olution of the issue by the Supreme Court. 395 U.S. at 346. 
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would be able to agree to a settlement, procure dissolution of the 
attachment, and thereafter bring a suit for restitution of the amount 
alleged to be excessive and extracted through coercion.109 Under this 
suggested procedure, the claim under the due process clause would 
be litigated in the suit for restitution, and any prejudgment attach• 
ment or garnishment found not to comport with due process of law 
would be declared to be per se coercive. 
In summary, the Court's recognition in Sniadach of the coercive 
effect of wage garnishment should greatly affect the doctrine of re-
lievable duress, which has almost consistently denied that any "legal" 
procedure can be found to be illegally coercive. If the doctrine is 
expanded to include coercive attachment practices that have tradi-
tionally been considered beyond its purview, debtors, by alleging 
duress, will be able to litigate the constitutionality of various forms 
of attachment without a continued loss of the use of their property. 
V. PosTJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT 
Another significant role which both Sniadach and a re-evaluated 
duress doctrine could play in expanding the scope of debtors' rights 
lies in the area of postjudgment garnishments. Of course, it might be 
argued that, since Sniadach is primarily a case involving procedural 
due process, it is inapplicable to attachments and garnishments that 
take place after a hearing has been provided and a decision has been 
reached by a competent court.110 But unfair treatment of poor debt-
ors may be a problem in cases involving postjudgment garnish-
ments as well as in cases involving prejudgment garnishments. 
Indeed, the Sniadach proscription of prejudgment wage garnish-
ment could arguably be illusory unless some type of relief is 
fashioned to aid those debtors injured by abuses of postjudgment 
garnishment. 
Creditors can make the provision for a hearing a sham by em-
ploying such procedures as sewer service, in which the debtor never 
gets notice of the hearing and does not even learn of the proceedings 
until after a default judgment has been entered.111 Even though the 
109. Although duress may also be raised as an affirmative defense to a suit on a 
settlement agreement, such a suit might well be initiated through another attachment, 
and thus the defendant will have gained nothing. 
110. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 (1924), in 
which the Court held that the due process clause does not require that notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing be afforded to a judgment debtor before issuance of a writ 
of garnishment. See also Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dis-
missed per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 (1969), which is discussed in notes 119-25 infra and 
accompanying text and in note 127 infra and accompanying text. 
111. The phrase "sewer service" describes the practice whereby a local process 
server swears in an affidavit tha"t he has personally delivered a summons to the named 
defendant at the specified address, when in reality he has thrown it away-that is, 
"into the sewer"-or left it under a door, in a mailbox, or with a person known not 
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failure to give notice to the defendant is a ground for opening a 
default judgment,112 it is questionable whether or not the debtor 
may thereby be returned to his former position if the judgment 
creditor has already filed a garnishment in execution of the judg-
ment. In those states in which no notice is required prior to a post-
judgment garnishment,113 for example, the debtor may remain 
unaware of the entire proceeding until his wages have actually been 
paid to his creditor. In order to recover, he must then successfully 
maintain a suit for restitution from his creditor.114 Pending the 
outcome of that claim, the alleged debtor will have been deprived 
of the use and enjoyment of his wages without an opportunity for 
a hearing. It was precisely this situation which was held in Sniadach 
to be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.115 In order to 
comply with the mandate of Sniadach, then, courts must provide 
to be the defendant named. Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 C0Lu111. J.L. & Soc. 
PROB. 17 (1967). This article quotes a New York assistant attorney general and 
local defense attorneys as testifying that sewer service "virtually permeates the service 
of legal process in the Civil Court in the City of New York" and that its extent is 
"very widespread," "epidemic," and "pervasive in consumer and landlord-tenant cases." 
Id. at 18. The authors further report that in most cases, the judgment debtor is not 
notified by the court of the default judgment rendered against him and that the first 
notice which he has of any of the proceedings comes at the time that his employer 
notifies him that his wages have been garnished. Id. at 20. See also Kripke, Gesture and 
Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1969). 
The creditor also has available other legal methods of placing the debtor at a 
disadvantage. One method is by manipulation of the secured sales transaction under 
article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. An example of such a transaction is the 
secured installment credit sale of automobiles. See Schuchman, Profit on Default: An 
Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. R.Ev. 20 (1969). 
Another method is to require confession of judgment as a condition of credit. See Note, 
Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 524 (1954). A third method, closely 
analogous to wage garnishment, is to require a wage assignment as a condition of credit. 
See Note, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment and the Right To Be Heard, 64 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 750, 761-64 (1969). 
112. See, e.g., Stubbs v. McGillis, 44 Colo. 138, 96 P. 1005 (1908); Harralson v. 
McArthur, 87 Ga. 478, 13 S.E. 594 (1894); Edson v. Edom, 108 Mass. 590 (1867); 
Lowman v. Ballard, 168 N.C. 16, 84 S.E. 21 (1915); Shanholtzer v. Thompson, 29 Okla. 
198, 103 P. 595 (1909). In New York, default judgments obtained following sewer 
service are so frequently opened that collection lawyers will agree to open a default 
judgment upon receiving a telephone call from the debtor's lawyer. Kripke, supra note 
Ill, at 38. 
IHI. New Mexico, for example, permits postjudgment garnishment without re-
quiring notice and a hearing. Moya v. Dellaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 607 (D.N.M. 1968), 
appeal dismissed per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 (1969). The United States Supreme Court has 
held that the due process clause does not require notice prior to postjudgment gar-
nishment. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 (1924), discussed 
in note 110 supra. 
114. New York, for example, provides that a court setting aside a judgment may 
also direct and enforce restitution. N.Y. Cxv. PRAC, LAw § 5015 (McKinney 1969). 
115. Moreover, even if the original claim is genuine, the debtor without notice 
prior to judgment is denied the opportunity to pay the debt prior to judgment. The 
judgment will generally include collection fees that could have been avoided, and 
the debtor's ability to obtain credit in the future will very likely be decreased. 
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restitution of the garnished wages when the debtor files a motion to 
open the judgment on the ground of lack of notice. It is therefore 
submitted that the courts should grant restitution on a preliminary 
showing by the wage earner that his motion has some chance of 
success.116 In states in which notice is required prior to a wage 
execution,117 less extreme measures are necessary. The courts may 
protect the wage earner by simply enjoining a levy of execution 
pending the hearing on the motion to open the judgment.118 
Some of the other possible evils of postjudgment garnishment 
are demonstrated by Moya v. DeBaca.119 In that case judgment was 
entered against a debtor in a suit instigated by his creditor to recover 
a debt. The debtor sought to arrange a method of paying the judg-
ment and offered to make installment payments greater than those 
which the creditor could have obtained through garnishment.120 The 
creditor refused that offer and demanded cash payment of an amount 
that exceeded the value of the judgment.121 In order to gain leverage, 
the creditor threatened to garnish the debtor's wages and thus cause 
him to be fired.122 The debtor sought injunctive relief on the basis 
of the due process clause, but a three-judge federal district court up-
held the constitutionality of the postjudgment wage garnishment 
procedure.123 The Supreme Court dismissed the debtor's appeal 
without explanation in a per curiam opinion,124 with Justices Harlan 
and Brennan arguing that the case should be remanded in light of 
Sniadach.125 
116. Since the time during which the wage earner is deprived of the enjoyment of 
his wages should be kept to a minimum, the courts should expedite the initial screen-
ing either through the use of sworn affidavits, or by use of an ex parte hearing. The 
penalty of perjury should be sufficient to safeguard against abuse of this procedure 
by the wage earner. 
117. New York, for example, generally provides for notice to the judgment debtor 
twenty days prior to levying against his wages in the hands of his employer. N.Y. C1v. 
PRAc. LAw § 5231 (McKinney 1969). 
118. In a case in which notice is "required" prior to execution, but nevertheless 
not provided, the courts should invoke the procedure suggested above for states with 
no notice requirement. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
119. 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 
(1969). 
120. 286 F. Supp. at 610 (Judge Theis, dissenting). 
121. The creditor's demand also included other claims against the debtor that 
were not reduced to judgment. 286 F. Supp. at 610 (Judge Theis, dissenting). 
122. 286 F. Supp. at 610 (Judge Theis, dissenting). 
123. Judge Theis dissented, however, and argued that wage garnishment statutes 
deny low-income wage earners equal protection and hence are unconstitutional on 
that ground. 286 F. Supp. at 610-14. In particular, see the discussion at 613. 
124. 395 U.S. 825 (1969). It is unclear exactly what the Supreme Court's dismissal 
means. If the Court felt that no substantial federal question was presented, then the 
decision probably was on the merits. See R. STERN &: E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURf 
PRACTICE 358 (1968). 
125. 395 U.S. at 825. 
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It is submitted that Justices Harlan and Brennan were correct-
that, although procedural due process may not be denied in a case 
dealing with postjudgment garnishment, such a case should be re-
viewed in light of Sniadach. As Moya itself indicates, postjudgment 
garnishment procedures can be used to exert extreme pressure on 
debtors: a judgment creditor may be able to garnish the wages of 
the debtor and thereby force him to lose his job if the latter refuses 
to pay the judgment on the creditor's terms. To the extent that 
Sniadach reflects some considerations of substantive due process,126 
that case may indicate a willingness on the part of the Court to 
proscribe this type of pressure.127 A fair solution to this problem 
would be to refuse to enforce postjudgment garnishment in cases in 
which the debtor has in good faith offered a payment plan with 
installments equal to, or greater than, the amount obtainable 
through garnishment.128 
A further problem demonstrated by Moya is that a creditor may 
threaten postjudgment garnishment in order to coerce the debtor 
to pay an inflated amount that includes additional claims not re-
duced to judgment.129 The availability of this type of leverage to 
force the settlement of inflated claims was one of the evils of wage 
garnishment expressly cited by the Court in invalidating prejudg-
126. See text accompanying note 57 supra. 
127. On the other hand, the Court's dismissal of the appeal in Moya may indicate 
the opposite-that the Court is not willing to review the validity of postjudgment 
garnishment. That indication is strengthened by the fact that the lower court in 
Moya had specifically refused to hear testimony regarding the effect of either pre- or 
postjudgment wage garnislunent: 
The questions of whether the garnishment laws work a hardship upon the eco· 
nomically depressed, and whether or not the statutes need revision, are for the 
Legislature and not for this Court. It need not be testified to that the present 
provisions are oppressive, or that their effect upon low-income families is disastrous 
and that reasonable men might find this unacceptable. However, "[t]he criterion 
of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good." 
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital ..• , 261 U.S. 
525, 570, •••• We may not declare a statute unconstitutional solely upon the 
ground that it is unjust and oppressive and will work hardship upon the poor. 
286 F. Supp. 606, 609 (1968). Nevertheless, in the last analysis, the Court's silence in 
.Moya leaves unresolved the question whether or not its decision was in fact on the 
merits. If the Court is willing in the future to recognize explicitly the considerations 
of substantive due process that it only hinted at in Sniadach, it might also be willing 
to overcome its reticence to deal on tl1ose grounds with the issue of postjudgment 
garnishment. 
128. At first glance this solution seems unfair to the creditor. However, the lever• 
age to force settlements whicll is arguably desirable for prejudgment garnishment has 
no application after judgment. Postjudgment garnislunent is solely a method for ex• 
ecution of a judgment. If the debtor offers a payment plan in good faith, that is, if 
he cannot offer a lump-sum payment, the creditor is in no worse position if he accepts 
this plan than he would be if he were to garnish the debtor's wages, and he may be 
spared some incidental costs of collection. 
129. If garnislunent actually occurs, the unadjudicated portion of the claim is 
simply a prejudgment garnishment. This garnislunent fits squarely within the holding 
of Sniadach and may readily be dissolved on that ground. 
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ment wage garnishment in Sniadach.130 Although this type of abuse
of postjudgment garnishment is probably not prevalent enough to
induce the Court to proscribe the postjudgment procedure entirely,
the doctrine of relievable duress, as re-evaluated in light of Sniadach
to apply to attachments and garnishments, could afford relief to the
coerced debtor. In such a situation, a modern duress doctrine could
afford either restitution of the excess payment or a valid defense to
a suit for nonpayment of an inflated settlement. 13'
130. See note 45 supra.
131. While this Note covers some of the most important areas in which the
Sniadach ruling could have impact, it has by no means covered all the areas which
may be affected by this important case. It is probable that Sniadach principles will
be used to challenge many other procedures now in force. In at least three separate
suits, for example, state procedures which can result in the prejudgment deprivation
of various forms of property have recently been challenged under the due process
clause. In Hebing v. Household Fin. Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Onondaga County), a suit
that has been dropped from the docket, the plaintiff argued that N.Y. PERS. PROp.
LAw §§ 46 to 49-b (McKinney 1962), which deals with wage assignments, denied them
due process of law under the principles of Sniadach, because that section provides for
deductions under a wage assignment without prior notice and an opportunity for a
hearing. 3 CLEARINGHOUSE RaV. 194 (1969). In Lawson v. Mantell, (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany
County, filed Aug. 20, 1969), buyers challenged the constitutionality of N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW art. 71 (McKinney 1969), which allows a seller to repossess merchandise upon the
posting of a bond in an amount twice the value of the property to be seized. The
buyers argued that this provision denies them due process under the principles of
Sniadach, since it affords buyers no opportunity to present a defense prior to seizure
of the property. 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 105 (1969). The lower court opinion was ad-
verse to plaintiffs. When the Appellate Division refused to stay the implementation of
article 71 pending appeal, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court and obtained
a temporary restraining order. The case has been argued before a three-judge court,
but the court has not yet rendered its decision. In Klim v. Jones, No. 52, 332 (N.D. Cal.,
filed Sept. 30, 1969) a three-judge federal district court has been convened to decide
the constitutionality in light of Sniadach, of the California Innkeepers Baggage-Lien
Law, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861(a) (West 1969), which allows California hotel keepers to
seize personal property of tenants upon an unverified claim that rent is owing.
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